Contents

Preface

1. DWI Offenses and Elements

2. Initial Stop, Field Sobriety Testing, and Arrest

3. Implied Consent and Breath and Blood Testing

4. Sentencing

5. Other Alcohol-Related Offenses

Appendices

5.1    Misdemeanor Offenses

5.1.1  Open Container

State law prohibits consumption or possession of alcoholic beverages in open containers in a motor vehicle, with limited exceptions.  §66-8-138.  The prohibition applies to all occupants of the vehicle, including the driver and passengers, and in some instances to owners of the vehicle, regardless of whether the owner is in the vehicle at the time of the offense. 

"Alcoholic beverages" are defined in the Motor Vehicle Code as “any and all distilled or rectified spirits, potable alcohol, brandy, whiskey, rum, gin, aromatic bitters or any similar alcoholic beverage, including all blended or fermented beverages, dilutions or mixtures of one or more of the foregoing containing more than one-half percent alcohol but excluding medicinal bitters.”  §66-1-4.1(D).

Vehicle Occupants.  It is unlawful while in a motor vehicle on a public highway within the state to:

Consume:

• Knowingly drink an alcoholic beverage.  §66-8-138(A).

Possess:

• Knowingly have in one’s possession, on one’s person;

• Any bottle, can or other receptacle containing any alcoholic beverage that has been:

• opened;
• had its seal broken; or
• the contents of which have been partially removed.  §66-8-138(B).

Owners.  It is unlawful for the registered owner of a motor vehicle to:

• Knowingly keep or allow to be kept in a motor vehicle;

• When the vehicle is on any public highway within the state;

• Any bottle, can or other receptacle containing any alcoholic beverage that has been:

• opened;
• had its seal broken; or
• the contents of which have been partially removed;

• Unless the container is kept in: 

• The trunk of the vehicle or in some other area not normally occupied by the driver or passengers if the vehicle is not equipped with a trunk (the utility or glove compartment is deemed to be within the area occupied by the driver and passengers); 
• The living quarters of a motor home or recreational vehicle; 
• A truck camper; or
• The bed of a pick-up truck, when the bed is not occupied by passengers.   §66-8-138(C).

The prohibitions in §66-8-138 do not apply to:

• Passengers in a bus, taxicab or limousine for hire licensed to transport passengers under the Motor Carrier Act or other legal authority.  §66-8-138(C).

• Any person who, upon the recommendation of a doctor, carries alcoholic beverages in his or her motor vehicle for medicinal purposes, §66-8-138(D)(1); or

• Any clergyman or his or her agent who carries alcoholic beverages for religious purposes in the clergyman's or agent's motor vehicle.  §66-8-138(D)(2).

Penalties

First Violation.  A first violation of §66-8-138 is a penalty assessment misdemeanor subject to a $25 fine.  §66-8-116(A).  A person who elects to appear in court rather than pay a penalty assessment, and who is subsequently convicted of the offense, cannot be fined in an amount higher than the penalty assessment and any probation imposed with a suspended or deferred sentence cannot exceed 90 days.  §66-8-116(C).  Note that the term "penalty assessment misdemeanor" does not include violations that cause or contribute to an accident resulting in injury or death.  §66-8-116(B). 

Subsequent Violations.  A second or subsequent violation of §66-8-138 is a misdemeanor punishable according to  §66-8-7.  §66-8-139(A).  Section 66-8-7(B) provides that unless another penalty is specified in the Motor Vehicle Code, individuals convicted of a misdemeanor violation of the Code shall be punished by:

• A fine up to $300; and/or

• Imprisonment up to 90 days.

In addition to any other penalty or disposition, a person convicted for a second or subsequent violation of §66-8-138 must have his or her driver's license revoked for:

• Three months for a second violation.

• One year for a third or subsequent violation.  §66-8-139(B).

Revocation is handled exclusively and administratively by the Motor Vehicle Division of the New Mexico Department of Transportation.  A judge may never revoke a defendant’s license nor may a judge ever physically remove a motorist’s driver’s license from them.

5.1.2  Driving While Revoked

Unlawful Activity

State law prohibits individuals from driving when they know, or should have known, that their driver’s license is suspended or revoked.  §66-5-39.  The offense is a misdemeanor with a mandatory jail sentence and a possible fine.  If the individual’s license was revoked because of a DWI conviction or an Implied Consent Act administrative revocation, the mandatory jail sentence is increased and a minimum fine must be imposed, with no suspension or deferment allowed.  §66-5-39(A).

Basic Offense.  Under §66-5-39(A), it is unlawful for:

• Any person;

• To drive;

• A motor vehicle;

• On any public highway in New Mexico;

• When the person’s privilege to do so is suspended or revoked; and

• The person knew, or should have known, that his or her license was suspended or revoked.

Driving While Revoked For DWI.  The offense commonly referred to as “driving while revoked for DWI” is a subset of the basic offense and has the same basic elements, with the additional requirement that the prosecution must prove the reason for the license revocation.  Accordingly, it is unlawful under §66-5-39(A) for:

• Any person;

• To drive;

• A motor vehicle;

• On any public highway in New Mexico;

• When the person’s privilege to do so is revoked, due to;

• a conviction for DWI,  or
• an administrative revocation resulting from the Implied Consent Act (§66-8-105 to §66-8-112)
            and

• The person knew, or should have known, that his or her license was revoked.

Knowledge of Suspension or Revocation.  For a conviction under §66-5-39(A), the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant actually knew, or should have known, of the license suspension or revocation.  Failure to instruct a jury about this essential element of the offense is fundamental error.  State v. Castro, 2002-NMCA-093, ¶ 2.  Proof can be based on direct or circumstantial evidence.  The prosecution is not required to provide direct evidence of the defendant’s subjective mental state.  “Because the subjective nature of intent makes proof through direct evidence difficult, intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence.”  State v. Herrera, 111 N.M. 560, 563 (Ct. App. 1991). 

The defendant in Herrera was convicted of driving while his license was revoked for a DWI conviction.  On appeal, the court held that the undisputed fact that the Motor Vehicle Division had mailed a written notice of license revocation to the defendant in accordance with the requirements of §66-2-11 did not create a legal presumption that the defendant had actual knowledge of the revocation.  Herrera at 565.  However, that fact could be used to support an inference the defendant knew about the license revocation.  “Permitting a fact finder to infer a defendant’s knowledge of a license revocation from prosecutorial proof that the department mailed the notice of revocation by registered mail to the defendant’s last address as shown by the records of the department is supported by reason and common sense.”  Herrera at 565, quoting Jolly v. People, 742 P.2d 891, 897 (Colo. 1987).

The court explained the nature and use of inferences:

The trier-of-fact may, based upon the evidence, make reasonable inferences supported by logic, common knowledge, and experience.  A conviction can only stand, however, if it is supported by evidence or reasonable inferences arising therefrom, rather than surmise or conjecture.  … An inference is sufficient to establish a fact if the evidence upon which the inference is based, taken as a whole and including the sum of permissible inferences, combine to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt.

Herrera at 565-566 (internal citations omitted).  The court found the following evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable inference the defendant was aware he was driving with a revoked license:

• Certified copies of MVD records showed that two separate notices of revocation were sent by certified mail to the defendant’s home address after he received two separate convictions for DWI.

• Both notices were unreturned to MVD.

• Both notices were sent to the same address listed as the defendant’s home address on a traffic citation issued personally to the defendant.

• The defendant did not challenge the accuracy of the address used on the mailings.

• Nine months prior to his arrest for driving while revoked, the defendant had been arrested for DWI and had refused to submit to a blood alcohol test.  The evidence showed the DWI arresting officer had complied with the provisions of §66-8-111.1 and advised the defendant that failure to submit to a chemical test would result in revocation of his license for one year.

In light of these facts, the court ruled there was sufficient evidence to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant knew his license was revoked at the time he was arrested for driving while his license was revoked.  Herrera at 566.

Penalties

Basic Offense.  The penalties for a conviction under §66-5-39 for driving while a license is suspended or revoked are:

• Imprisonment for not less than 4 days or not more than 364 days, or participation for an equivalent period of time in a certified alternative sentencing program; and

• A fine up to $1,000.  When a defendant pays all or part of the cost of participating in a certified alternative sentencing program, the court may apply the payment as a deduction to any fine the court imposes.

There is no specific statutory restriction on suspending or deferring these penalties, so traditional judicial discretion apparently applies.  

Driving While Revoked For DWI.  The penalties for a conviction under §66-5-9, when the license revocation was for a DWI conviction or resulted from an Implied Consent Act administrative action, are:

• Mandatory imprisonment for not less than 7 consecutive days; and

• A mandatory fine of not less than $300 or not more than $1,000.

§66-5-39(A).  The imprisonment and fine for driving while revoked for DWI can not be suspended, deferred or taken under advisement.  The defendant can not plead guilty to another charge as a way of satisfying a charge for driving while revoked for DWI.

Additional Penalty.  In addition to these penalties for both the basic revocation offense and for driving while revoked for DWI, when a person is convicted of this offense, or a municipal ordinance that prohibits driving on a suspended or revoked license, the motor vehicle the person was driving must be placed in an immobilization device for thirty days, unless immobilization poses an imminent danger to the health, safety or employment of the person's immediate family or the family of the owner of the motor vehicle.  The convicted person is required to bear the cost of immobilizing the motor vehicle.  §66-5-9(B).

5.1.3  Boating While Intoxicated

Unlawful Activity

The Boating While Intoxicated Act, §66-13-1 through §66-13-13, is structured in a fashion similar to the DWI statute and the Implied Consent Act.  It applies only to operation of motorboats.

Definitions.  “Motorboat” is defined as “any boat, personal watercraft or other type of vessel propelled by machinery, whether or not machinery is the principle source of propulsion.”  Motorboat also includes “a vessel propelled or designed to be propelled by a sail” but does not include “a sailboard or a windsurf board” or “a houseboat or any other vessel that is moored on the water, but not moving on the water.”  §66-13-2(C).

“Operate” is defined in §66-13-2(D) as “to physically handle the controls of a motorboat that is moving on the water.”

Offenses.  The Boating While Intoxicated Act makes it unlawful for:

• A person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to operate a motorboat.  §66-13-3(A).

• A person who is under the influence of any drug to a degree that renders him incapable of safely operating a motorboat to operate a motorboat.  §66-13-3(B).

• A person who has an alcohol concentration of eight one hundredths or more in his blood or breath to operate a motorboat.  §66-13-3(C).

• A person to commit aggravated boating while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, which occurs when a person:   

  (1)  has an alcohol concentration of .16 or more in his blood or breath while operating a motorboat;   
  (2)  has caused bodily injury to a human being as a result of the unlawful operation of a motorboat while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs; or   
  (3)  refused to submit to chemical testing, as provided for in the Boating While Intoxicated Act, and in the judgment of the court, based upon evidence of intoxication presented to it, was determined to be under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs.  §66-13-3(D)(1-3).

Penalties.  The Act imposes limitations on a defendant’s option to plead guilty to other charges to avoid a conviction for boating while intoxicated.  Under §66-13-4, when a defendant is charged with violating §66-13-3 and the defendant’s breath and/or blood test results are .08 or higher, any plea entered in satisfaction of the charges must include at least a guilty plea to one of the subsections of §66-13-3.  The defendant cannot plead guilty to another charge in order to satisfy the boating while intoxicated charge.

For a first conviction under the Act, an offender shall be punished by:

• Imprisonment for up to 90 days; and/or

• A fine of up to $500.

• Note that if the sentence is suspended in whole or in part or deferred, the period of probation may extend beyond 90 days but shall not exceed one year.

• In addition, the court must order the offender to attend a boating safety course approved by the National Association of State Boating Law Administrators.  The offender must provide the court with proof of successful course completion within seven months of conviction or prior to completion of probation, whichever time period is less.

In addition to those penalties, when an offender commits aggravated boating while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, the offender shall be sentenced to at least 48 consecutive hours in jail and may be fined up to $750.

On a first conviction, any time spent in jail for the offense prior to the conviction for this offense must be credited to any term of imprisonment.

A deferred sentence is considered a first conviction for the purpose of determining subsequent convictions.   

For a second or subsequent conviction under the Act, an offender shall be punished by:

• Imprisonment for up to 364 days; and/or

• A fine of up to $750.

• Note that if the sentence is suspended in whole or in part or deferred, the period of probation shall not exceed one year.

In addition to those penalties, when an offender commits aggravated boating while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, the offender shall be sentenced at least 48 consecutive hours in jail and may be fined up to $1000.

See the full provisions of the Boating While Intoxicated Act, §66-13-1 through §66-13-13, for additional details about blood alcohol testing and implied consent in the context of operating a motorboat.

Note on Operation of Other Water Vessels While Intoxicated.  Under §66-12-11(B) of the state Boat Act, it is unlawful for any person to operate or manipulate while intoxicated or under the influence of a narcotic drug, barbiturate or marijuana:

• Any vessel not defined as a motorboat under the Boating While Intoxicated Act, or
• Any water skis, surfboard or similar device.

No penalties are specified in §66-12-11(B), but a violation of the Boat Act is a petty misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment up to 6 months and/or a fine of up to $500.  §66-12-23, §31-19-1(B).

5.2    Felony Offenses

5.2.1  Vehicular Homicide and Great Bodily Harm by Vehicle

Unlawful Activity

See UJI Criminal 14-240, 14-243 and 12-245 for instructions on the essential elements of this offense.

Serious injury or death caused by an alcohol or drug impaired driver are crimes governed by §66-8-101.  This statute addresses two offenses:

• Homicide by vehicle.  Also known as “vehicular homicide,” this is the killing of a human being in the unlawful operation of a motor vehicle.  §66-8-101(A). 

• Great bodily harm by vehicle.  This is the injuring of a human being, to the extent defined in §30-1-12, in the unlawful operation of a motor vehicle.  §66-8-101(B).  According to §30-1-12(A), "great bodily harm" means an injury to a person that:

• Creates a high probability of death; or
• Causes serious disfigurement; or
• Results in permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any member or organ of the body.

Committing homicide by vehicle or great bodily harm by vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs is a third degree felony punishable in accordance with the felony sentencing provisions in §31-18-15.  §66-8-101(C).  It is also a third degree felony to commit homicide by vehicle or great bodily harm by vehicle while violating the prohibition in §66-8-113 against reckless driving.  Speeding in violation of the law cannot in itself be used as the basis for a reckless driving violation and hence a violation of §66-8-101.  §66-8-101(C).  Willful operation of a motor vehicle in violation of §30-22-1(C) (willful refusal to stop a vehicle when signaled by a uniformed officer in a police vehicle) that directly or indirectly causes death or great bodily harm is a third degree felony as well.  §66-8-101(F). 

Court cases have established the following principles concerning vehicular homicide:

• When a vehicular homicide charge is based on DWI, a defendant cannot be convicted of both vehicular homicide and DWI as separate offenses.  To do so would violate the defendant’s constitutional right against double jeopardy because in those circumstances DWI is a lesser-included offense of vehicular homicide.  State v. Santillanes, 2000-NMCA-017, ¶ 15, reversed on other grounds, State v. Santillanes, 2001-NMSC-018.

• When multiple deaths occur due to vehicular homicide, each death is a separate violation of the statute.  Vehicular homicide punishes the killing of another, not the unlawful operation of a motor vehicle.  State v. House, 2001-NMCA-011.

• When a defendant causes the death of a child by driving while intoxicated, the prosecution has discretion to charge the defendant with either vehicular homicide or child abuse resulting in death (§30-6-1), or both.  State v. Santillanes, 2001-NMSC-018, ¶ 27.  The constitutional protection against double jeopardy precludes conviction on both charges, however.  Santillanes at ¶ 27.  When a defendant is convicted of both, the conviction for vehicular homicide must be vacated because it merges into the greater offense of child abuse resulting in death with respect to the death of the same victim.  Santillanes at ¶ 27.  Note also that driving while impaired can be the basis for a conviction of child abuse not resulting in death.  State v. Castaeda, 2001-NMCA-052.

Penalties

For a third degree felony, the basic sentence is 3 years of imprisonment and a fine up to $5,000.  §31-18-15(A)(8), (E)(8).

For a third degree felony resulting in the death of a human being, the basic sentence is 6 years of imprisonment and a fine up to $5,000.  §31-18-15(A)(6), (E)(6).  Vehicular homicide is, by its nature, a third degree felony resulting in the death of a human being and, therefore, is subject to the 6 year basic sentence.  State v. Guerro, 1999-NMCA-026. 

According to §31-18-15(B), the basic sentence of imprisonment must be imposed unless the court alters the sentence pursuant to:

• §31-18-15.1 (adjustment by up to one third due to aggravating or mitigating circumstances);

• §31-18-16 (additional 1-3 years for use of a firearm); or

• §31-18-17 (additional 1-8 years for habitual offenders with prior felony convictions). 

DWI Conviction Enhancement.  The basic sentence for a defendant convicted of homicide by vehicle or great bodily harm by vehicle, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, must be increased by 4 years for each of the defendant’s prior DWI convictions within the past 10 years.  §66-8-101(D).  For this purpose, "prior DWI conviction" means:

• A prior conviction under §66-8-102; or 

• A prior conviction in New Mexico or any other jurisdiction, territory or possession of the United States, including a tribal jurisdiction, for the criminal act of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.  §66-8-101(E).

5.2.2  Injury to Pregnant Woman by Vehicle

See UJI Criminal 14-240A and 14-246 for instructions on the essential elements of this offense.

The offense of injury to a pregnant woman by vehicle was enacted in 1985 as §66-8-101.1.  The elements as set forth in §66-8-101.1(A) are:

• Injury;

• To a pregnant woman;

• By a person other than the pregnant woman;

• In the unlawful operation of a motor vehicle;

• Causing the pregnant woman to suffer a miscarriage or stillbirth;

• As a result of the injury. 

Committing injury to a pregnant woman by vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs is a third degree felony punishable in accordance with the felony sentencing provisions in §31-18-15.  §66-8-101.1(C).  It is also a third degree felony to commit injury to a pregnant woman by vehicle while violating the prohibition in §66-8-113 against reckless driving.  Speeding in violation of the law cannot in itself be used as the basis for a reckless driving violation and hence a violation of §66-8-101.1.  §66-8-101.1(C). 

A defendant can be convicted of both vehicular homicide under §66-8-101 and injury to a  pregnant woman by vehicle under §66-8-101.1 without violating the right against double jeopardy.  State v. Begay, 105 N.M. 498 (Ct. App. 1987).  Double jeopardy prohibits conviction for two offenses only when one offense necessarily involves another, either under a statutory analysis of the elements of each offense in light of the facts, or where it is impossible to commit one offense without necessarily committing the other.  The offense of vehicular homicide or injury to a pregnant woman by vehicle can be committed without necessarily committing the other offense, and neither offense requires proof of the same operative facts as the other.  Vehicular homicide is proved by showing the victim died of injuries caused by the defendant's unlawful operation of a motor vehicle; injury to a pregnant woman is proved by showing the defendant, while unlawfully operating a motor vehicle, caused injury to the victim resulting in a miscarriage or still birth.  Begay at 502.

Penalties

For a third degree felony, the basic sentence is 3 years of imprisonment and a fine up to $5,000.  §31-18-15(A)(8), (E)(8).

For a third degree felony resulting in the death of a human being, the basic sentence is 6 years of imprisonment and a fine up to $5,000.  §31-18-15(A)(6), (E)(6). 

According to §31-18-15(B), the basic sentence of imprisonment must be imposed unless the court alters the sentence pursuant to:

• §31-18-15.1 (adjustment by up to one third due to aggravating or mitigating circumstances);

• §31-18-16 (additional 1-3 years for use of a firearm); or

• §31-18-17 (additional 1-8 years for habitual offenders with prior felony convictions). 

5.3    Under Age 21 DWI-Related Offenses

Alcohol and DWI-related offenses committed by individuals under age 18 are governed by the state Children’s Code, §32A-1-1 et seq. 

The Children’s Code is a collection of laws concerning the welfare of children and their families.  The Code defines a “child” as an individual under 18 years old, and an “adult” as an individual age 18 or older.  §32A-1-4(A), (B).  The Code establishes a division in the district court for each county known as the “children's court.”  Designated district judges serve as judge of the children's court.  §32A-1-5(A).  The children’s court has exclusive original jurisdiction for all cases involving delinquency, child abuse and neglect, and adoption.  §32A-1-8(A).

The Children’s Code includes the Delinquency Act, §32A-2-1 et seq.  The Act is intended to hold children accountable for their unlawful actions based on their age, education, mental and physical condition, background and other relevant factors, without subjecting them to the adult consequences of criminal behavior.  §32A-2-2(A).  The Act designates a number of DWI-related offenses as delinquent acts for which children are subject to various consequences. 

Note:  For individuals age 18-21, alcohol and DWI-related offenses are governed by the regular provisions of state law, with an additional restriction in the Liquor Control Act that prohibits this age group from buying, receiving, possessing or being served alcohol.  §60-7B-1. 

See “Penalties for Under-21 Alcohol Offenses” in Appendix B.2 (Tab 7).

5.3.1 Under Age 18:  Delinquent Acts

The Delinquency Act defines “delinquent act” in §32A-2-3(A) as:

• An act;

• Committed by a child (i.e. under age 18);

• That would be designated as a crime under the law;

• If committed by an adult.

Delinquent acts include the following offenses committed by a child in violation of the Motor Vehicle Code or a municipal traffic code:

• Driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs.

• Homicide by vehicle.

• Reckless driving.

• Driving with a suspended or revoked license.

§32A-2-3(A)(1).

It is also a delinquent act for a child to:

• Buy, attempt to buy, receive, possess or be served any alcoholic liquor.

• Be present in a licensed liquor establishment, other than a restaurant or a licensed retail liquor establishment, except in the presence of the child's parent, guardian, custodian or adult spouse.

§32A-2-3(A)(2).

Since under §32A-1-8(A)(1) delinquency cases can be handled only in children’s court, municipal, magistrate and metropolitan courts have no jurisdiction over any proceedings filed under the Delinquency Act.  The detailed requirements in the Children’s Code for delinquency procedures and the rights of children from the time they are taken into custody through hearing and disposition, found at §32A-2-1 et seq., are beyond the scope of this publication.  

When the children’s court has adjudicated a child as a delinquent offender for one of the alcohol-related violations listed above, the court has the following options under §32A-2-19(B) for disposition of the case:

• A fine, not to exceed the fine that could be imposed if the child were an adult;

• Any disposition authorized for disposition of a neglected or abused child;

• Transfer of legal custody of the child pursuant to the Delinquency Act for appropriate placement, supervision, rehabilitation or treatment;

• Probation under court-imposed conditions and limitations; or

• Confinement in a local detention facility for up to fifteen days within a 365-day period.

In addition, if a child age 15 or older is adjudicated as delinquent for violation of §32A-2-3(A)(2), the child's driving privileges may be denied or the child's driver's license may be revoked for 90 days.  For a second or a subsequent adjudication, the child's driving privileges may be denied or the child's driver's license revoked for one year.  §32A-2-19(H).  The actions on the child’s driving privileges are done administratively by the Motor Vehicle Division upon receipt of the court order adjudicating delinquency. 

5.3.2  Age 18-21:  DWI-Related Offenses

Generally, laws against DWI and related violations, including laws against committing vehicular homicide, consumption or possession of an open container of alcohol in a motor vehicle and reckless driving, apply the same to persons who are age 18-21 as they do to adults.  The Liquor Control Act, however, includes a criminal offense in §60-7B-1 that applies only to this age group.

Minor in Possession

Unlawful Activity.  An alcohol offense that applies specifically to individuals age 18-21 is the prohibition in the Liquor Control Act commonly known as “minor in possession.”  §60-7B-1.  As used in the Liquor Control Act, “minor” means a person under age 21.  60-7B-1(E).  Section 60-7B-1(C) makes it illegal for minors to buy, attempt to buy, receive, possess or permit themselves to be served with alcoholic beverages.  This offense is a misdemeanor.  In actuality, §60-7B-1(C) only applies to persons age 18-21, for when an individual under age 18 engages in similar activity the offense is a delinquent act, as defined in §32A-2-3(A)(2), and is handled in children’s court under the Children’s Code.

Penalties.  A conviction for violation of §60-7B-1(C) is subject to the following penalties:

• First offense:

• Fine up to $1,000; and
• 30 hours of community service related to reducing the incidence of DWI.  §60-7B-1(G)(1).

• Second offense:

• Fine up to $1,000;

• 40 hours of community service related to reducing the incidence of DWI; and

• Suspension of the offender’s driver’s license for 90 days.  If the minor is too young to possess a driver's license at the time of the violation, 90 days must be added to the date the minor would otherwise become eligible for a license.  §60-7B-1(G)(2).

• Third or subsequent offense:

• Fine up to $1,000
• 60 hours of community service related to reducing the incidence of DWI; and
• Suspension of the offender’s driver’s license for 2 years or until age 21, whichever is greater.  §60-7B-1(G)(3).