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Part C: Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings

Chapter 15: Adjudicatory Hearing

15.1. Purpose
15.2. Timeline
15.2.1. 60 Day Deadline
15.2.2. Extensions of Time
15.2.3. Requirement is Jurisdictional

15.3. Initiation and Notice
15.4. Participants
15.5. Conduct of Hearing
15.5.1. No Right to Jury Trial
15.5.2. Making a Record
15.5.3. Definitions of Abuse and Neglect
15.5.4. Aggravated Circumstances
15.5.5. Reasonable Efforts

15.6. Admissions or No Contest Pleas
15.7. Consent Decrees
15.8. Evidence
15.9. Burden of Proof
15.10. Findings 
15.10.1. Abuse or Neglect; Aggravated Circumstances
15.10.2. Reasonable Efforts
15.10.3. Custody

15.11. Order
15.12. Motion for New Hearing
15.13. Checklist

15.1 PURPOSE
The adjudicatory hearing is the trial in the abuse or neglect case. It entails a full evidentiary hearing complete with all of the protections of due process. The findings made at this hearing determine whether the state continues to intervene in the life of the family.

15.2 TIMELINE

15.2.1 60 DAY DEADLINE
The adjudicatory hearing must be commenced within 60 days of the latest of the following:

  1. the date that the petition is served on the respondent;
  2. the date of the termination of any diversion agreement;
  3. if a mistrial is declared or a new trial is ordered by the trial court, the date that such order is filed; or
  4. in the event of an appeal, the date that the mandate or order is filed in the district court disposing of the appeal.

The statute on adjudicatory hearings, §32A-4-19, lists the first, third and fourth dates identified above but not the second. The reference to diversion agreements was added by amendment to the Children’s Court Rules in 1999. See Rule 10-320(A).

While the term “diversion agreement” is not defined in the statute or rules, it is reasonably clear that a consent decree would be included. Rule 10-307(B) sets out the criteria for use of a consent decree. Rule 10-307(K) allows for the revocation of consent decrees.

15.2.2 EXTENSIONS OF TIME
Extensions may be granted under Rule 10-320(C):

  • By the children’s court judge for good cause shown, provided the aggregate of all extensions granted by the judge does not exceed 30 days; or
  • By the Supreme Court, a justice of the Supreme Court or a judge designated by the Supreme Court, for good cause shown. The 30 day aggregate limit does not apply.

For an extension by the children's court judge:

  • The petition for an extension must be verified and state concisely the facts that the petitioner deems to constitute good cause.
  • The petition must be filed within the 60 day period described in §15.2.1 except that a petition can be filed within 10 days of the expiration of that period if based on exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the state or children’s court.

For an extension by the Supreme Court, a justice or a designated judge:

  • The two rules just listed apply.
  • Within five (5) days of the filing of the petition for an extension, opposing counsel may file an objection to the extension, setting forth the reasons for the objection.
  • No hearing is held except upon order of the Supreme Court.
  • If the Supreme Court finds that there is good cause for an extension, it will fix the time limit within which the adjudicatory hearing must commence.

15.2.3 REQUIREMENT JURISDICTIONAL
The 60-day deadline, or the deadline as extended, is jurisdictional. The neglect and abuse petition must be dismissed if the hearing is not begun within the 60 day period or within the period of any extension granted. §32A-4-19(D); Rule 10-320.

Practice Note. It is suggested that courts set aside at least one half day within the 60 day window for this hearing.

The statute and rule require that the hearing be “commenced” or “begun” within the allotted time. This approach is very similar to the approach taken in Rule 5-604(B) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires dismissal with prejudice if trial is not commenced within a specified period. The courts have held that Rule 5-604(B) requires that the defendant’s trial commence within the prescribed period; it does not require that the trial be completed within that period. State v. Rackley, 2000-NMCA-27, ¶4, 128 N.M. 761, citing State v. Higgins, 107 N.M. 617 (Ct. App. 1988). The court in Rackley observed that there is no requirement in the rule that all subsequent stages of the trial be contiguous. However, it also stated that it would scrutinize closely any prolonged, unjustified delay or conduct suggestive of an attempt to circumvent the rule. Id. ¶¶6, 7. What constitutes the commencement of an adjudicatory hearing, which is a bench trial, has not been determined by case law.

Because of the requirements of and shortened time frames under the Adoption and Safe Families Act, it is recommended that any practice of continuing adjudicatory hearings not become commonplace, and that the matter be heard and concluded as expeditiously as possible. See Handbook §38.4 on ASFA. The adjudicatory hearing needs to be concluded early enough to give parents even a minimal amount of time to try to follow the treatment plan.

15.3 INITIATION AND NOTICE
As a matter of practice, the children’s court attorney is responsible for notifying the parties of the hearing and assuring that it is timely held. Similarly, any party who has requested an extension of time is responsible for ensuring that any new date for the hearing falls within the time allowed and that all parties are notified of the change.

Practice Note. It is preferable that, whenever possible, the adjudicatory hearing be set and announced in open court while the parties are present at the initial custody hearing. This ensures that the parties are aware of the date early on and should minimize the need for extensions of time. Due to the short time frame, the court, the attorneys and their support staffs also need to communicate and cooperate on scheduling matters, especially if hearings need to be vacated and/or reset.

15.4 PARTICIPANTS
The participants in the adjudicatory hearing include the parties, their attorneys and the witnesses. The court may exclude a child under 14 from the hearing if it finds that this is in the child’s best interest. The court may also exclude a child who is 14 or older, but only after making a finding that there is a compelling reason to exclude the child and stating the factual basis on the record. §32A-4-20(E), added in 2005.

A transport order may be needed if the respondent is incarcerated; ensuring that parents who are incarcerated can participate meaningfully in the hearing is important. See Handbook §22.5.8. See State ex rel. CYFD v. Maria C., 2004-NMCA-083, 136 N.M. 053 (discussing the importance of respondent’s presence at permanency hearings). If the person is in federal prison, habeas corpus may be a means of bringing the parent into state court for the hearing. If for any reason, through no fault of their own, a parent is unable to attend court, alternative methods of participation in the proceedings should be considered. See, State ex rel. CYFD v. Ruth Anne E., 1999-NMCA-035, 126 N.M. 670.

Although there is no right for foster parents who are not parties to be heard at the adjudicatory hearing, as there is at the judicial review or permanency hearing, foster parents and CASA volunteers may be present as observers, subject to court approval and the confidentiality provisions of §32A-4-20(C). Foster parents could be called as witnesses by one of the parties as well.

Abuse and neglect hearings are closed to the general public. Persons the court finds have “a proper interest in the case or in the work of the court” may be allowed to attend on the condition that they refrain from divulging information that would identify the child or family. Similar rules apply to the news media. Persons granted admission who intentionally divulge protected information are guilty of a petty misdemeanor. §32A-4-20; see also Handbook §13.4.

A common predicament occurs when the respondent is not present, but the attorney for the respondent appears. Technically this is not a situation for a default judgment. State ex rel. CYFD v. Stella P., 1999-NMCA-100, ¶23, 127 N.M. 699. An inquiry on the record should go to the questions of actual notice, whether attempts to provide notice were reasonable under the circumstances of the case, communication with counsel, and the like. State ex rel. CYFD v. Maria C., 2004-NMCA-083, 136 N.M. 053. One approach may then be to postpone the hearing in hopes that the respondent will attend, but this is only an option if time permits. Another approach, suggested obliquely in Stella P., would be to proceed with the trial but to require that the state prove abuse or neglect by clear and convincing evidence, as if the respondent were present and contesting the allegations. Id. ¶¶30, 36.

If a respondent who has not yet testified appears, the court should receive the testimony of that respondent concerning the identity and whereabouts of any other person who may have a custodial or protected interest in the child, and the nature of that relationship.

If not previously resolved, the court should determine whether the child is an Indian child.

15.5 CONDUCT OF HEARING

15.5.1 NO RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
The parties do not have a right to a jury trial in an abuse or neglect case. State ex rel. CYFD in the Matter of T.J., 1997-NMCA-021, 123 N.M. 99; see Committee Commentary to Rule 10-304.

15.5.2 MAKING A RECORD
The court’s decision at the adjudicatory hearing is an appealable one. State ex rel. CYFD v. Frank G., 2005-NMCA-026, 137 N.M. 137, affirmed on other grounds in Pamela A.G. below. Also, basic due process considerations apply to the hearing. State ex rel. CYFD v. Kathleen D.C., 2007-NMSC-018, 141 N.M. 535; In the Matter of Pamela A.G., 2006-NMSC-019, 139 N.M. 459.

It is very important that the practitioners before the court make a good record, offer the evidence that should be offered, and state objections clearly on the record. Because of the press of business and the general preference for informality in other aspects of an abuse or neglect case, both the court and the attorneys may be inclined to be less formal than in other types of trials. However, since the record made will be critical to any appeal taken, counsel and the court should fully develop the record, as fundamental liberty interests are implicated. See State ex rel. CYFD v. Amanda M., 2006-NMCA-133, ¶¶20-22, 140 N.M. 578, and §32A-4-17 (initial summons in abuse/neglect proceeding must indicate that the proceedings could result in a termination of parental rights).

In a number of Court of Appeals’ decisions, the court has declined to address an issue because it was not preserved below. In State ex rel. CYFD v. Patricia N., 2000-NMCA-035, 128 N.M. 813, appellants criticized the children’s court for not ordering a predisposition report to obtain certain information about the child. The Court of Appeals declined to address the issue, finding no indication that the issue was preserved below, there being no record showing whether a disposition report was ordered or not. Id. ¶11. See also In Re Pamela A. G, 2006-NMSC-019, 139 N.M. 459.

15.5.3 DEFINITIONS OF ABUSE OR NEGLECT
The court must determine whether the allegations of the petition are true, by admission or proof. If the allegations are denied, the court must proceed to hear the evidence and make and record its findings on whether the child is an abused child, a neglected child or both.

The definitions of “abused child” and “neglected child” are critical in determining what must be proven and found. Given their importance, the current definitions are set forth in full:

"Abused child" means a child:
  1. who has suffered or who is at risk of suffering serious harm because of the action or inaction of the child’s parent, guardian or custodian;
  2. who has suffered physical abuse, emotional abuse or psychological abuse inflicted or caused by the child's parent, guardian or custodian;
  3. who has suffered sexual abuse or sexual exploitation inflicted by the child's parent, guardian or custodian;
  4. whose parent, guardian or custodian has knowingly, intentionally or negligently placed the child in a situation that may endanger the child's life or health; or
  5. whose parent, guardian or custodian has knowingly or intentionally tortured, cruelly confined or cruelly punished the child. §32A-4-2(B).

According to the Court of Appeals, the definition of “physical abuse” in the Abuse and Neglect Act applies to the term when used in the definition of “abused child.” State ex rel. CYFD in the Matter of Vincent L., 1999-NMCA-089, ¶9, 125 N.M. 452. “Physical abuse, as currently defined in the Act, includes but is not limited to any case in which the child exhibits evidence of skin bruising, bleeding, malnutrition, failure to thrive, burns, fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma, soft tissue swelling or death and:

  1. there is not a justifiable explanation for the condition or death;
  2. the explanation given for the condition is at variance with the degree or nature of the condition;
  3. the explanation given for the death is at variance with the nature of the death; or
  4. circumstances indicate that the condition or death may not be the product of an accidental occurrence. §32A-4-2(F).

Other terms that are used in the definition of “abused child” and that have their own definitions are “sexual abuse” and “sexual exploitation.” “Sexual abuse” includes but is not limited to criminal sexual contact, incest or criminal sexual penetration as those acts are defined by state law. §32A-4-2(G). See §§30-9-11, 30-9-13 and 30-10-3.

“Sexual exploitation” includes but is not limited to:

  1. allowing, permitting or encouraging a child to engage in prostitution;
  2. allowing, permitting, encouraging or engaging a child in obscene or pornographic photographing; or
  3. filming or depicting a child for obscene or pornographic commercial purposes, as those acts are defined by state law.

§32A-4-2(H).

"Neglected child" means a child:

  1. who has been abandoned by the child’s parent, guardian or custodian;
  2. who is without proper parental care and control or subsistence, education, medical or other care or control necessary for the child's well-being because of the faults or habits of the child's parent, guardian or custodian or the failure or refusal of the parent, guardian or custodian, when able to do so, to provide them;
  3. who has been physically or sexually abused, when the child's parent, guardian or custodian knew or should have known of the abuse and failed to take reasonable steps to protect the child from further harm;
  4. whose parent, guardian or custodian is unable to discharge his responsibilities to and for the child because of incarceration, hospitalization or physical or mental disorder or incapacity; or
  5. who has been placed for care or adoption in violation of the law; provided that nothing in the Children's Code may be construed to imply that a child who is being provided with treatment by spiritual means alone through prayer, in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination, by a duly accredited practitioner thereof is for that reason alone a neglected child within the meaning of the Children's Code; and further provided that no child shall be denied the protection afforded to all children under the Children's Code. §32A-4-2(E).

“Abandonment,” a term used in the above definition of “neglected child,” includes instances when the parent, without justifiable cause:

  1. left the child without provision for the child’s identification for a period of fourteen days; or
  2. left the child with others, including the other parent or an agency, without provision for support and without communication for a period of:

    • three months if the child was under six years of age at the commencement of the three-month period; or
    • six months if the child was over six years of age at the commencement of the six-month period. §32A-4-2(A).

Leaving an infant at a hospital in accordance with the Safe Haven for Infants Act protects a parent, guardian, or custodian from criminal prosecution for child abandonment, but does not protect against abuse and neglect proceedings under the Children’s Code. §24-22-3 (as amended in 2005). The 2005 amendments to the Children’s Code also deleted the language in §24-22-7 that provided that there would be no presumption of abuse or neglect against a person seeking reunification within 30 days of the infant being left.

Neglect also occurs when a parent fails to provide medical care necessary for the child’s well-being when the parent is able to provide such care. §32A-4-2(E). In State ex rel. CYFD v. Amanda M., 2006-NMCA-133, ¶¶29-30, 140 N.M. 578, the Court of Appeals upheld an adjudication of abuse and neglect when the evidence demonstrated that mother did not recognize and seek treatment for the child’s severe head trauma even though the injury was visible to others who saw the child later and which the testimony established would have been visible to mother.

In State ex rel. CYFD v. Amanda H. (not to be confused with Amanda M.), 2007-NMCA-029, ¶¶ 21-31, 141 N.M. 259, the Court of Appeals reversed an adjudication of neglect because of insufficient evidence. The evidence showed that the baby’s positive toxicology result was likely a false positive, that mother’s admitted use of illegal drugs during the first trimester of her pregnancy did not cause the baby to be born with a drug addiction or any other health problem, and that mother’s history of violence, past drug addiction, and criminality had not rendered her unable to properly care for her child. The court held that the evidence was not clear and convincing that mother either intentionally or negligently disregarded her child’s well-being and needs, as required by §32A-4-2(E)(2), or that she was unable to provide proper parental care of her child because of her history of drug addiction, criminal misconduct, and violence, as required by §32A-4-2(E)(4). On its own, risk of future neglect is not evidence of neglect as defined in these statutes. Id. ¶29.

15.5.4 AGGRAVATED CIRCUMSTANCES
A specific inquiry occurs when CYFD alleges that the respondent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances, as defined in §32A-4-2 below. When aggravated circumstances are alleged, the court must make and record its findings on whether aggravated circumstances have been proven. The concept of aggravated circumstances is important, not with respect to whether the child is an abused or neglected child, but with respect to whether CYFD must undertake reasonable efforts to preserve or reunify the family. Specifically, when the court finds aggravated circumstances exist, it may decide that CYFD is not required to make reasonable efforts toward preservation or reunification. See §15.5.5 below, as well as §16.11.2. See also State ex rel. CYFD v. Amy B., 2003-NMCA-017, 61 P.3d 845.

"Aggravated circumstances" include those circumstances in which the parent, guardian or custodian has:  
  1. attempted, conspired to cause or caused great bodily harm to the child or great bodily harm or death to the child's sibling;
  2. attempted, conspired to cause or caused great bodily harm or death to another parent, guardian or custodian of the child;
  3. attempted, conspired to subject or has subjected the child to torture, chronic abuse or sexual abuse; or
  4. had his parental rights over a sibling of the child terminated involuntarily. §32A-4-2(C).

Included within the definition of aggravated circumstances is the phrase “great bodily harm,” which is also defined. “Great bodily harm” means an injury to a person that creates a high probability of death, that causes serious disfigurement or that results in permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any member or organ of the body. §32A-4-2(D).

15.5.5 REASONABLE EFFORTS
The court should consider whether reasonable efforts have been made to prevent removal of the child from the home or to make it possible for the child safely to return to the home. ASFA requires that the court make a "reasonable efforts" determination within 60 days of the removal of the child from the home. This determination may be made in the ex parte custody order, at the custody hearing, or at the adjudicatory hearing if the hearing takes place within the 60 day window. (Failure to make this determination within 60 days will result in the child being rendered ineligible for federal foster care payments for the duration of his or her stay in foster care.) See Handbook §38.4 on ASFA.

15.6 ADMISSIONS OR NO CONTEST PLEAS
Most often, if there is going to be an admission or no contest plea, the admission or plea will have resulted from the pre-adjudicatory meeting and be scheduled before the court accordingly. However, a respondent could decide at any time, even in mid-trial, not to contest any further. At that point, counsel for the respondent should inform the court that the respondent is prepared to enter an admission, either by:

  • admitting sufficient facts to permit a finding that some or all of the allegations of the petition are true; or
  • declaring his intention not to contest some or all of the allegations in the petition. Rule 10-307(A).

The court cannot accept an admission without first addressing the respondent personally, in open court, to ensure that the admission is given freely, knowingly and voluntarily. Rule 10-307(C). The court must determine that the respondent:

  • understands the allegations of the petition;
  • understands the dispositions that the court may make if the allegations of the petition are found to be true;
  • understands that he has a right to deny the allegations in the petition and to have a trial on them; and
  • understands that if he makes an admission, he is waiving his right to trial; and that the admission is voluntary and not the result of force or threats or promises other than those in any consent decree agreement. Rule 10-307(C).
Practice Note. The Amy B. case indicates the importance of ensuring that the respondent understands the consequences of his or her no contest plea if the plea is to allegations of aggravated circumstances. That plea may contribute to a finding by the court that CYFD no longer has to undertake reasonable efforts to reunify. See State ex rel. CYFD v. Amy B., 2003-NMCA-017, ¶12, 133 N.M. 136.

Before accepting an admission (or no contest plea), the court must satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for accepting it. The Rules of Evidence do not apply to inquiries made to determine whether there is a factual basis for an admission. Rule 10-307(D), (I).

If the child is in CYFD’s custody, the court must accept or reject the admission within five days after the admission is made. Rule 10-307(H). Once the court accepts an admission, with the exception of an admission accepted for purposes of a consent decree, the court may proceed to make any disposition permitted by law that it deems appropriate under the circumstances. Rule 10-307(E).

Practice Note. If the respondent makes an admission as to some but not all of the allegations in the petition, CYFD may proceed to prove the allegations that were not admitted. Whether the department will want to do so depends on the nature of the allegations in the case and the importance, if any, of obtaining findings on them.

To the extent that the disposition is tied to the findings in the adjudication, it may be very important to have a particular finding. The availability of treatment for the respondent or possibly the child may be dependent, for example, on the findings in the adjudication.

15.7 CONSENT DECREES
A consent decree in an abuse or neglect proceeding is an order of the court, after an admission has been made, that suspends the proceedings and in which, under terms and conditions negotiated and agreed to by the respondent and CYFD:

  • legal custody of the child is transferred to CYFD for a period not to exceed six months from the date of the decree; and
  • the child is allowed to remain with the respondent or other person, and the respondent will be under CYFD supervision for a period not to exceed six months. Rule 10-307(B).

If the court accepts the consent decree, the court may approve the disposition provided for in the decree or another disposition more favorable to the respondent that the one provided. If the court rejects the consent decree, the decree is null and void. Rule 10-307(F).

The procedural rules that apply to admissions, described in §15.6 above, also apply to consent decrees. See Rule 10-307.

Admissions and Consent Decrees - Some Pros and Cons

Admissions may be necessary to lay the groundwork for the treatment plan that is needed. Combined with a dispositional order, they also provide more flexibility than a consent decree. The circumstances of children and families can change and the court is able to adjust a dispositional order more readily than a consent decree, which would have to be renegotiated by the parties, a time-consuming and cumbersome process.

Also, the focus of a consent decree is upon the fulfillment of, or compliance with, the terms of the consent decree by the respondents, rather than the change in behavior needed to allow the child to be safe in the home. Rule 10-307(J) and (K). There is a subtle shift in the focus of the proceedings away from the well being of the child.

Consent decrees may be desirable from the respondents’ point of view in that they forestall a finding of neglect or abuse. On the other hand, due to their conditional or provisional nature, consent decrees may simply defer litigation and cause confusion if questions arise as to whether the conditions have been fulfilled. It is important to state the obvious, which is that a consent decree requires agreement, and CYFD may be constrained by its statutory duties from agreeing to consent decrees in many cases.

15.8 EVIDENCE
The Rules of Evidence apply at the adjudicatory hearing. Rule 10-115; Evidence Rule 11-1101. See State ex rel. CYFD in the Matter of Esperanza M., 1998-NMCA-039, 124 N.M. 735, for a discussion of evidentiary issues arising in an adjudicatory hearing; see also Chapter 27 on evidence. In some cases due process may require that a respondent be able to present expert evidence in response to the evidence presented by CYFD or other parties. See State ex rel. CYFD v Kathleen D.C., 2007-NMSC-081, 141 N.M. 535.

15.9 BURDEN OF PROOF
CYFD bears the burden of proof. It must prove that the child is an abused or neglected child, as the case may be, by clear and convincing evidence that is competent, material and relevant in nature. §32A-4-20(H). The statute does not specify the standard required to prove the existence of aggravated circumstances but the same clear and convincing standard is generally considered to apply. The courts have come close to addressing this issue but have not specifically ruled on it. See State ex rel. CYFD v. Amy B., 2003-NMCA-017, ¶12, 61 P.3d 845. But see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (constitutional requirement of clear and convincing evidence is needed only for permanent termination of parental rights).

15.10 FINDINGS

15.10.1 ABUSE OR NEGLECT; AGGRAVATED CIRCUMSTANCES
The court must make and record any finding that the child is neglected or abused. The order ought to reflect first whether the finding was made pursuant to an admission or after an evidentiary hearing. If the former, the order should state that a sufficient factual basis for the admission was provided, as required by Rule 10-307; if the latter, it should state that proof was by clear and convincing evidence and should be accompanied with appropriate findings of fact.

Any finding as to proof of aggravated circumstances must also be included in the order, including a recitation of the factual basis for the finding.

15.10.2 REASONABLE EFFORTS
The order should address the issue of reasonable efforts to prevent removal or reunify the family. The order should include sufficient findings related to the specific facts and circumstances of the case. These findings could be made by incorporating documentation supplied by CYFD, if all parties are in agreement on the substance of the report or findings. See Handbook §13.7.4, as well as §38.4 on ASFA. 

15.10.3 CUSTODY
The order should provide for custody of the child pending the next proceeding, which would be the dispositional hearing, and include a finding that such custodial arrangement is in the best interest of the child. §32A-4-20(J).

15.11 ORDER
Any order of dismissal should state the grounds (such as a stipulation, lack of timeliness, or failure of proof) and clearly indicate that custody of the child is restored to the respondent. (Under §32A-4-20(H), if the court does not find that the child is abused or neglected, the court must dismiss the petition and may refer the family to CYFD for appropriate services.)

Another possibility is that a parent, guardian or custodian who was not made a party to the petition appears at the hearing. The court may award custody of the child to that person and dismiss the case, depending on the circumstances. See Handbook §12.4 for further discussion.

15.12 MOTION FOR NEW HEARING
A motion for a new adjudicatory hearing may be filed within ten days of entry of judgment. A motion based on newly discovered evidence may be made within 30 days of judgment but, if an appeal is pending, the court may grant the motion only on remand. The motion may be granted if the evidence will probably change the result, was discovered after the original hearing and could not have been discovered before with due diligence, is material to the issue, is not merely cumulative, and is not merely impeaching or contradictory. Rule 10-120(A). These motions are also subject to being denied automatically, if they are not granted within certain time frames. Rule 10-120(B).

The court may relieve a party from a final judgment after 30 days for a number of reasons, including mistake or excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence which could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial earlier, or misrepresentation. This motion must be made within a reasonable time and, in some cases, no more than one year after the judgment. Rule 10-120(C).

15.13 CHECKLIST
To view an adjudicatory hearing checklist, click here: PDF.

 

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